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Extending existing work on the conditional automaticity of category activation, the
present research investigated the extent to which category activation is moderated by the
resolution of visual attention. As visual attention gates access to material in semantic
memory, so too should it regulate the activation of social categories when triggering verbal
labels are encountered. Accordingly, only when triggering stimuli fall within the spotlight
of attention did we expect category activation to occur.The results of two studies supported
this prediction. We consider the implications of our ﬁndings for recent treatments of
categoryautomaticity. r 1999Academic Press
In attempting to make sense of the surrounding stimulus world, perceivers
regularly construct and use categorical representations to simplify and structure
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No. of Pages—13 First page no.—590 Last page no.—602the complex demands of the person-perception process. A debate that has
dominated recent theorizing about the nature and function of these representations
concerns the conditions under which social categories and their associated
stereotypes are activated by perceivers in their dealings with others (see Bargh,
1999; Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998; Fiske, 1989). Put simply, is category
activation an unconditionally automatic mental process or can it be avoided under
certain circumstances?
While several theorists have argued for the inevitability of category (hence
stereotype) activation (e.g., Allport, 1954; Bargh, 1999; Brewer, 1988; Devine,
1989; Dovidio, Evans, & Tyler, 1986; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990), recent research
has identiﬁed some important constraints on this process (e.g., Blair & Banaji,
1996; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Lepore & Brown, 1997; Macrae, Bodenhausen,
Milne, Thorn, & Castelli, 1997). Gilbert and Hixon (1991), for example, have
demonstrated that stereotype activation can be impeded under conditions of
attentional depletion (see also Spencer, Fein, Wolfe, Fong, & Dunn, 1998). In a
similar vein, perceivers’temporary goal states also appear to play a pivotal role in
the regulation of category activation. In particular, activation does not occur when
the social meaning of a target is irrelevant to perceivers’ current information-
processing concerns (Macrae et al., 1997). Finally, people’s beliefs about the
members of stigmatized groups also impact upon the activation of schematic
knowledge structures. An emerging literature has conﬁrmed that, unlike their
prejudiced counterparts, egalitarian individuals are able to avoid stereotype
activation when presented with a triggering categorical cue (Fazio, Jackson,
Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Lepore & Brown, 1997; Locke, MacLeod, & Walker,
1994; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997). Thus, it seems that category activation is
not unconditionally automatic or inevitable (cf. Bargh, 1999); instead, it appears
to be responsive to perceivers’ attentional limitations, temporary goal states, and
chronic beliefs.
Noting the obvious theoretical importance of work of this kind, the present
studies were motivated by a desire to expand our knowledge of the conditions
governing category activation. Of particular interest was the question of whether
perceivers can successfully avoid category activation when spatial visual atten-
tion is focused away from a triggering categorical cue that is present in the visual
ﬁeld. Consider, for example, the phenomenon of parafoveal priming. It is well
known that stimuli presented away from the locus of focal attention (i.e., stimuli
that register on retinal regions outside the fovea) are capable of producing
semantic activation, even though the perceiver may have no conscious awareness
of the stimuli (e.g., Fuentes, Carmona, Agis, & Catena, 1994; Fuentes & Ortells,
1993). For instance, Fuentes and Ortells found that performance on a Stroop task
was inﬂuenced by stimuli presented parafoveally. This phenomenon produces
several adaptive advantages for perceivers, such as the parafoveal preview beneﬁt
in reading (e.g., Everatt & Underwood, 1992; Kennison & Clifton, 1995).
Preconscious processing of upcoming words (i.e., before they have received a
foveal ﬁxation) guides eye movements in a manner that focuses conscious
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this ‘‘preview’’ screening to occur, of course, the stimuli must have been
processed in some fashion prior to perceivers’conscious awareness of them.
But can the semantic activation elicited by parafoveally presented stimuli be
avoided? If social perceivers are consciously focusing their attention at one
location, can they avoid activating a category that is cued by a stimulus that is
present at another location? Recent research would suggest that indeed they can,
with both perceivers’ processing goals and the perceptual demands of the task at
hand moderating construct activation (LaBerge, Brown, Carter, Bash, & Hartley,
1991; Lavie, 1995; Ortells &Tudela, 1996). But would the same be true for social
categories, stimuli which have been characterized by some as being so over-
learned that their activation is simply inevitable (Allport, 1954; Bargh, 1999;
Devine, 1989)? If perceivers are indeed unable to avoid category activation even
when the triggering stimulus lies outside the focus of their focal attention, then
models asserting the inevitability of category activation would gain considerable
support (Brewer, 1988; Devine, 1989; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). However, it may
be more likely that perceivers are indeed able to avoid category activation when
triggering stimuli are presented outside focal attention (Lavie, 1995), if such
activation serves no useful purpose in attaining their immediate processing
objectives (Macrae et al., 1997).
THE SPOTLIGHT OF ATTENTION
But how can we focus our attention on some things while simultaneously
ignoring others? According to James (1890), the answer is simple; selective
attention can be likened to a spotlight, with objects that fall within its beam
enjoying privileged processing. As Broadbent (1982) has argued, ‘‘think of
selectivity as like a searchlight, with the option of altering the focus. When it is
unclear where the beam should go, it is kept wide. When something seems to be
happening, or a cue indicates one location rather than another, the beam sharpens
and moves to the point of maximum importance’’ (p. 271). To identify the
resolution of visual attention, researchers have traditionally employed visual
search tasks of one sort or another. One particular favorite is the ﬂanker task, a
modiﬁed version of which will be used in the present work. Devised over 20 years
ago by Eriksen and his colleagues (see Eriksen, 1995), the ﬂanker task utilizes
response competition to measure the extent to which unattended stimuli are
processed by perceivers.
In the original version of the ﬂanker task, Eriksen and Eriksen (1974) varied the
distance between a central letter and neighboring items (i.e., ﬂanker letters) that
appeared on the left and right of the target. Participants were shown a target letter
from one of two sets (i.e., C and S or H and K) and instructed to move a lever to
the left or right depending upon the stimulus–response mapping they had been
given (e.g., if C or S move the lever to the left; if H or K move the lever to the
right). Simultaneously, irrelevant ﬂanking letters also appeared on the screen and,
critically,sometimestheselettersweredrawnfromtheaforementionedtargetsets.
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ﬂanking items were assigned to a different response class than the target letter
(e.g., C ﬂanked by K’s). If response times to the target letters were impaired under
these conditions, then this would indicate that participants had processed and
extracted the meaning of the unattended (i.e., irrelevant) ﬂanking stimuli. Impor-
tantly, while ﬂanker interference was observed in this research, the results
revealed that the amount of interference was a function of the degree of physical
separation between the attended and unattended stimuli, with near ﬂankers
prompting greater interference.1 As Eriksen has since noted, ‘‘there is a gradient
around the spatial location of the attended target and only distracters within about
1.5° of the target elicit response competition’’(1995, p. 111).
Extrapolating from this kind of ﬁnding, in the present work we sought to
examine whether the presentation of social category labels (a more semantically
rich and arguably more potent potential distracter) would also produce ﬂanker
interference effects. More important, we wanted to determine whether such
effects are limited to cases in which the labels are presented within the spotlight of
attention or whether the effect might generalize to stimuli that engage only
peripheral attentional mechanisms. If social categories are so strongly over-
learned that their activation is inevitable upon registration of a relevant cue
(Devine, 1989), then even spatially distant category cues may produce ﬂanker
interference. However, if perceivers are indeed able to focus their attentional
‘‘spotlight’’ effectively on the target stimulus, then category cues outside the
spotlight of attention may have little effect on task performance.
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Participants and design. Eighteen undergraduates (9 women and 9 men) were
paid £2 for their participation in the experiment. The experiment had a 2 (ﬂanker
status: mismatching or control) 3 2 (ﬂanker location: near or far) repeated-
measures design.
Stimulus materials and procedure. Participants arrived at the laboratory indi-
vidually, were greeted by a male experimenter, and seated facing the screen of an
Apple Macintosh microcomputer (Power Mac 7500/100). The experimenter then
explained that the study was a gender-categorization task. In the center of the
computer screen, a number of forenames would appear (e.g., peter, clare). The
task was simply to report, by means of a key press, whether each forename was
characteristically male or female. The experimenter instructed each participant to
perform this task as quickly and accurately as possible. In total, 60 forenames
appeared on the screen, 30 of which were male names (e.g., ian, john, david) and
30 of which were female names (e.g., ann, mary, susan). The forenames were all
1 Under certain conditions, spatially distant ﬂankers have been shown to produce signiﬁcant
interference effects (Lavie, 1995; Miller, 1991). This demonstration is important as it conﬁrms that
limitations in visual attention rather than visual acuity moderate the elicitation of construct interfer-
ence.
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an additional instruction to each participant. Speciﬁcally, he told the participant
that on each trial an additional item would appear on the screen. It was stressed,
however, that these additional items were irrelevant to the task and should be
ignored. In reality, of course, these items comprised the critical ﬂanking stimuli
(see Eriksen, 1995). During the task, each forename (e.g., peter) was paired once
with the name of a common object (e.g., kettle, chair, table) and once with a
gender-mismatching forename (e.g., angela), giving a total of 120 trials. Across
the stimulus presentations, there were therefore two classes of experimental trial:
mismatches occurred when the gender of the two forenames was inconsistent;
control trials occurred when the forenames were paired with common objects.2
Thus, relative to performance in the control condition, the mismatching condition
enabled us to investigate the extent to which participants processed the categori-
cal meaning of the unattended stimuli. If these ﬂankers were processed categori-
cally, response times to the target items should be impaired (see Macrae,
Bodenhausen, Milne, Castelli, Schloerscheidt, & Greco, 1998).
The stimuli were presented on an Apple 17-in. monitor, set to a resolution of
640 3 480 pixels with a refresh rate of 67 Hz. During the experiment, the
computer screen was painted white. Participants were seated 57 cm from the
screen and were instructed to ﬁxate on a small black cross (i.e., ﬁxation cross) that
was located in the center of the screen. To maintain a ﬁxed viewing distance, each
participant’s chin was placed in a support (i.e., chin rest) for the duration of the
experiment. Stimuli were drawn in an off-screen buffer and were copied onto the
screen in synchrony with the computer’s vertical blank signal. On each trial, the
ﬂanking stimulus appeared unpredictably either above or below the forename.
Across all the trials, the ﬂankers appeared an equal number of times above and
below the forenames.
The experimenter explained that the target forenames would always be located
on the ﬁxation cross. On each trial, the ﬁxation cross appeared for 1000 ms, then a
forename and a ﬂanking stimulus appeared simultaneously on the screen. The
forename remained on the screen for 2000 ms or until the participant responded.
The ﬂanking stimulus was presented for 184 ms, then erased. The interstimulus
interval was 1000 ms. The forenames and ﬂanking stimuli were black and were
drawn in Apple’s Geneva font. The forenames were centered both horizontally
and vertically on the ﬁxation cross (which was erased immediately before the
forename appeared). The ﬂankers were also horizontally centered on the screen.
However, they were positioned either above or below the forename at one of two
locations such that the topmost pixels of an upper ﬂanker were either 0.7° or 1.7°
of visual angle above the ﬁxation cross and the bottommost pixels of a lower
2 In the present experiment, we did not include a condition where target items were ﬂanked by
gender-matching forenames. Elsewhere, also in the context of a gender-categorization task, it has been
shown that matching ﬂankers do not facilitate task performance (Macrae et al., 1998). Given the ease
with which gender can be inferred from a presented forename, it may be impossible to improve task
performance through the provision of gender-matching ﬂankers.
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stimulus conﬁgurations created the near and far ﬂanker conditions (Eriksen,
1995). Presentation of the stimuli was randomized for each participant by
computer software and participants made their responses by pressing one of two
labeled keys (i.e., ‘‘male’’ or ‘‘female’’). The meaning of the response keys was
counterbalanced across the experiment and the computer recorded the latency and
accuracy of each response. Upon completion of the task, participants were
debriefed, paid, thanked for their participation, and dismissed.
Results and Discussion
The dependent measure of interest in this experiment was the mean time taken
by participants to categorize the forenames by gender.All trials where participants
categorized the forenames incorrectly (5.3% of trials) were excluded from the
statistical analysis. Error rates in the near and far ﬂanker conditions were
equivalent (respective Ms: 5.4% vs 5.1%). Because of an unduly high error rate
(14%), one participant was excluded from the statistical analysis. Prior to the
analysis, a log transformation was performed on the data. For ease of interpreta-
tion, however, the untransformed means are reported in Table 1.
Preliminary analysis revealed no effect of the gender of participants on task
performance, consequently the data were collapsed across this factor. Partici-
pants’categorization times were submitted to a 2 (ﬂanker status: mismatching or
control) 3 2 (ﬂanker location: near or far) repeated-measures analysis of variance
(ANOVA).Thisanalysisrevealedmaineffectsofﬂankerstatus[F(1,16) 5 10.69,
p , .005] and ﬂanker location [F(1, 16) 5 28.60, p , .0001] on participants’
categorization times. As expected, however, these effects were modiﬁed by a
signiﬁcant ﬂanker status 3 ﬂanker location interaction, F(1, 16) 5 5.36, p , .04
(see Table 1 for treatment means). Simple effects analysis conﬁrmed that
categorization times were slower on mismatching than control trials in the near
ﬂanker condition, F(1, 16) 5 12.57, p , .003. Importantly, no such difference
emerged in the far ﬂanker condition, F(1, 16) 5 1.16, ns. In addition, categoriza-
tion times were slower in the near than far ﬂanker condition on both mismatching
[F(1, 16) 5 28.16, p , .0001] and control [F(1, 16) 5 11.01, p , .004] trials.
TABLE 1
Mean Categorization Times (in Milliseconds) as a Function of Flanker Status and Location
(Experiment 1)
Flanker
status
Flanker location
Near Far
Control 642 (74) 612 (80)
Mismatching 676 (79) 620 (82)
Interference 34 8
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses.
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cues did not occur. Only when mismatching ﬂankers fell within the spotlight of
attention did they impair performance on the gender-categorization task. When
the ﬂankers engaged peripheral attentional mechanisms, category interference
was not observed (Eriksen, 1995; Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). Extending previous
research, then, these ﬁndings reveal another factor upon which category activa-
tion would appear to be conditional—namely, the resolution of visual attention.
There are, however, some limitations with Experiment 1 that merit consideration.
The ﬁnding of theoretical interest was that far ﬂankers did not impede perfor-
mance on the gender-categorization task, thereby suggesting that these items fell
outside the spotlight of attention (Eriksen, 1995). Of course, a quite different
explanation can also be offered for the failure of construct interference to emerge
in this condition—perhaps the far ﬂankers were never processed at all.While such
an outcome is unlikely given previous work on this topic (see Eriksen, 1995;
Lavie, 1995; Miller, 1991), in the present experimental context it is not possible to
refute this competing explanation without additional evidence.
The motivation for our second experiment, therefore, was quite straightfor-
ward. Speciﬁcally, we sought to demonstrate that while distant ﬂankers do not
activate categorical representations and hence do not impede performance on the
gender-categorization task, they are nevertheless processed by perceivers. To
investigate this issue, we made a simple modiﬁcation to our original experimental
procedure. Following the gender-categorization task, participants were given an
ostensibly separate experiment in which they were required to report whether a
stimulus (e.g., kettle or susan) referred to the name of an object or the name of a
person (i.e., an item-classiﬁcation task). Of the presented forenames, half were
items that had previously appeared as ﬂankers (near and far) in the gender-
categorization task, whereas the other forenames were entirely new items. Our
logic was as follows. For items that were presented (i.e., processed) before, one
would expect to observe facilitated responding in the item-classiﬁcation task, as
these stimuli have recently been actively represented in memory (see Roediger &
McDermott, 1993; Schacter, 1987).The question of interest concerns whether this
is true of both near and far ﬂankers. If far ﬂankers are indeed processed by
perceivers in the initial gender-categorization task, then these stimuli should
enjoy a classiﬁcation advantage (relative to new forenames) when they are
reencountered on the second task (Scarborough, Gerard, & Cortese, 1979).
EXPERIMENT 2
Method
Participants and design. Twelve female undergraduates were paid £2 for their
participation in the experiment.The experiment had a 2 (ﬂanker status: mismatch-
ing or matching) 3 2 (ﬂanker location: near or far) repeated-measures design.
Stimulus materials and procedure. Participants arrived at the laboratory indi-
vidually, were greeted by a male experimenter and seated facing the screen of an
Apple Macintosh microcomputer (PowerPC G3).This experiment was basically a
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a new control condition against which construct interference could be established,
the object/control trials were replaced with gender-matching trials (see Eriksen,
1995; Macrae et al., 1998). These trials were created by pairing gender-matching
ﬂankers with the target forenames. In total, 40 forenames appeared on the screen;
20 of which were male names and 20 of which were female names. During the
task, each target item was paired once with a gender-mismatching forename (i.e.,
mismatching trials) and once with a gender-matching forename (i.e., matching
trials), giving a total of 80 trials. In all other respects, the procedure was identical
to Experiment 1.
Upon completion of the gender-categorization task, the experimenter instructed
each participant that she would be required to perform another response-time task.
On this occasion, either the name of a person (e.g., mark) or the name of an object
(e.g., knife) appeared in the center of the computer screen. The task was simply to
report, by means of a key press (as quickly and accurately as possible), the
identity of the stimulus (i.e., person name or object name?). In total, 64 items
appeared in the test (32 forenames and 32 objects). Of the 32 forenames, 16 were
items that had previously appeared as ﬂankers (8 near and 8 far) in the
gender-categorization task, the other 16 were entirely new forenames. Each item
remained on the screen until the participant made a response. Presentation of the
stimuli was randomized for each participant by computer software and partici-
pants made their responses by pressing one of two labeled keys (i.e., ‘‘person’’or
‘‘object’’). The meaning of the response keys was counterbalanced across the
experiment and the computer recorded the accuracy and latency of each response.
Upon completion of the task, participants were debriefed, paid, thanked for their
participation, and dismissed.
Results and Discussion
Gender-categorization task. The dependent measure of interest was the mean
time taken by participants to categorize the forenames by gender.All trials where
participants categorized the items incorrectly (4.1% of trials) were excluded from
the statistical analysis. Error rates in the near and far ﬂanker conditions were
equivalent (respective Ms: 4.5% vs 3.7%). Prior to the statistical analysis, a log
transformation was performed on the data. For ease of interpretation, however, the
untransformed means are reported in Table 2.
Participants’categorization times were submitted to a 2 (ﬂanker status: match-
ing or mismatching) 3 2 (ﬂanker location: near or far) repeated-measures
ANOVA. This revealed a main effect of ﬂanker status [F(1, 11) 5 5.13, p , .05]
and a marginal effect of ﬂanker location [F(1, 11) 5 3.86, p , .08] on partici-
pants’categorization times.As expected, however, these effects were modiﬁed by
a signiﬁcant ﬂanker status 3 ﬂanker location interaction, F(1, 11) 5 16.44, p ,
.002 (see Table 2 for treatment means). Simple effects analysis conﬁrmed that
categorization times were slower on mismatching than matching trials in the near
ﬂanker condition, F(1, 11) 5 16.63, p , .002. Importantly, no comparable effect
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times were slower in the near than far ﬂanker condition on mismatching trials,
F(1, 11) 5 18.32, p , .001. Extending Experiment 1, then, these ﬁndings
conﬁrmed the effects of ﬂanker location on category activation. They did so,
however, under conditions in which all the stimuli (i.e., ﬂankers) were relevant to
the task of gender categorization. In Experiment 1, the control items were the
names of common objects, items that are irrelevant with respect to gender
classiﬁcation (at least in the English language). In the present experiment, in
contrast, gender-matching ﬂankers were employed in the control condition
(Macrae et al., 1998), thus all the ﬂankers were equated in terms of the extent to
which they conveyed gender information.As before (i.e., Experiment 1), category
activation only emerged in the near ﬂanker condition.
Item-classiﬁcation task. The dependent measure of interest was time taken by
participants to classify the forenames. There were no errors on this task. Prior to
the statistical analysis, a log transformation was performed on the data. For ease
of interpretation, however, the untransformed means are reported. Participants’
classiﬁcation times were submitted to a single factor (item type: old-near or
old-far or new) repeated-measures ANOVA. This revealed an effect of item type
on participants’ classiﬁcation times, F(2, 11) 5 7.52, p , .004. Post hoc Tukey
testsconﬁrmedthatparticipantsofferedfasterresponsesbothtoold-near(M 5 568
ms) and old-far (M 5 561 ms) items than they did to entirely new forenames
(M 5 619 ms, both ps , .01). In other words, in the classiﬁcation task there was
an advantage for old forenames, regardless of their previous ﬂanker location
(Roediger & McDermott, 1993). Taken together, then, these ﬁndings conﬁrm that
participants do indeed process the distant ﬂankers.As these items fall outside the
spotlight of attention, however, they do not produce category activation and hence
do not give rise to ﬂanker interference (Eriksen, 1995).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We hypothesized that the resolution of visual attention may be a fundamental
determinant of category activation. The theoretical basis of our prediction was an
extensive literature in cognitive psychology documenting how visual attention
TABLE 2
Mean Categorization Times (in Milliseconds) as a Function of Flanker Status and Location
(Experiment 2)
Flanker
status
Flanker location
Near Far
Matching 645 (92) 652 (81)
Mismatching 730 (103) 639 (71)
Interference 85 213
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Eriksen, 1995; LaBerge et al., 1991). In line with this literature, we postulated that
the resolution of visual attention should moderate the activation of social
categories when perceivers are presented with triggering verbal labels. At ﬁrst
blush, this line of inquiry may appear somewhat removed from the topic of person
perception. In reality, however, it is well suited to an investigation of the
determinants of category activation. Inspection of the existing literature reveals
that much of the evidence for the automaticity of category activation has been
collected in studies that employ semantic priming procedures and verbal stimulus
materials (e.g., Devine, 1989; Dovidio et al., 1986; Perdue & Gurtman, 1990). If
categorical priming effects can be eliminated under these same conditions, this
would seriously undermine the assumption that category activation is inevitable, a
viewpoint that has dominated thinking in social psychology for almost half a
century (Allport, 1954).
Conﬁrming our reasoning, category activation was indeed moderated by the
resolution of visual attention. Only when triggering stimuli (i.e., forenames) fell
within the spotlight of attention (i.e., within about 1° of visual angle) did
perceivers proceed to activate associated categorical representations. This ﬁnding
is noteworthy for a number of reasons. Previous research on this topic has tacitly
assumed that the mere registration of a verbal label is sufficient to prompt
category activation—indeed, claims of category automaticity rest upon the
veracity of this supposition (see Devine, 1989; Dovidio et al., 1986; Macrae,
Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994; Perdue & Gurtman, 1990). As it turns out,
however, when triggering stimuli fall outside the beam of the attentional spotlight,
category activation does not occur.
Notwithstanding the potential theoretical signiﬁcance of this ﬁnding, some
puzzling issues remain. In particular, given our contention that category activation
is moderated by the resolution of visual attention, why is it that a handful of
studies have demonstrated category activation without seemingly satisfying this
criterion? To date, some of the most compelling evidence for category automatic-
ity has been gathered in studies that have used parafoveal priming techniques to
present participants with triggering verbal labels (e.g., Devine, 1989; Lepore &
Brown, 1997; Macrae, Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1995).Although these parafoveal
stimuli (e.g., category labels) ostensibly fall outside the spotlight of attention,
they nevertheless prompt category activation. Given the present results, how can
this be?
The resolution of this puzzle, we suspect, may reside in the perceptual demands
of parafoveal priming tasks. In a typical category-priming experiment (e.g.,
Devine, 1989; Lepore & Brown, 1997), while ﬁxating on a central cross,
participants are required to report the location of multiple ﬂashes that appear at
different locations on the screen.Two points are worthy of mention here. First, the
central cross is perceptually redundant, as responses are not required to items at
ﬁxation. Second, successful task performance demands the rapid detection of
spatially distinct perceptual events. These task characteristics, we believe, may
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participants may periodically avert their gaze from the ﬁxation cross, hence detect
the identity of the priming stimuli on some trials. The large number of priming
trials and the relatively long exposure duration (e.g., 100 ms) of the priming
stimuli may serve to encourage just this sort of effect. Alternatively, as no
response is required to items at ﬁxation, this may prompt a widening of the
attentional spotlight (see Broadbent, 1982; Lavie, 1995), hence a semantic
appraisal of the priming labels (Devine, 1989; Lepore & Brown, 1997). This
widening of focal attention does not occur in the present ﬂanking procedure,
however, as participants are required to respond to items that appear at ﬁxation
(Lavie, 1995). Thus, procedural differences between parafoveal priming and
ﬂanker tasks may account for apparent discrepancies between the present ﬁndings
and some previous research on the topic of category activation.
CONCLUSIONS
Our intention in the present article was to demonstrate how basic limitations in
the resolution of visual attention may moderate the process of category activation.
We were generally successful in this regard. Only when triggering verbal labels
fell within the spotlight of attention did category activation occur, thereby
conﬁrming the conditional automaticity of this process (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991;
Macrae et al., 1997). Of course, were mental life to unfold in any other way, it is
difficult to imagine how social perceivers could begin to make sense of others.
The limits of visual attention ensure that irrelevant perceptions or sensations
rarely overwhelm us (Broadbent, 1982; James, 1890). If all unattended visual
stimuli (including people) were afforded a complete semantic analysis, life as we
know it would grind to a shuddering halt. That psychological paralysis is avoided
so effortlessly is testimony to the power of selective attention—through its silent
workings, selective attention inoculates the mind from the specter of cognitive
debilitation. Social cognition, of course, is no exception to this rule.Where people
are concerned, we may frequently see more than we can know.
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